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Thinking about Queer Wars:  ‘International Polarization’ and Beyond 
 
Cynthia Weber, University of Sussex 
 
Dennis Altman and Jonathan Symons’ book Queer Wars is a useful point of 
departure for thinking about sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) 
issues in contemporary international politics.  It is motivated by two important 
empirical questions: ‘Why, as homosexuality has become more visible globally, 
have reactions to sexual and gender diversity become so polarized?’ and ‘What is 
to be done?’ (2016:3-4)  At the heart of these questions is an ethical and practical 
concern to combat the violence faced by those who are called ‘LGBT’ (and 
sometimes ‘Q’ and/or ‘I’)  people’, which should be applauded.  It adds much to 
these discussions, with its careful empirical illustrations and comparative 
analysis.   
 
What informs these questions is Altman and Symons’ view that contemporary 
sovereign nation-states find themselves in conflict with one another over LGBT 
issues, as new norms that value LGBT people and particularly LGBT human 
rights are diffused through the internationalization of Western liberal agendas 
(see Weiss and Bosia, 2013).  These ‘queer wars’ as Altman and Symons call 
them have resulted in the  ‘international polarization’ of primarily ‘liberal states’ 
vs. ‘illiberal states’ over LGBT issues (Altman and Symons, 2016:Chapter 5).   
 
The international polarization thesis has several advantages.  It makes sense to 
mainstream International Relations theorists, who have long understood the 
world in binary terms.  It makes sense to global policy practitioners, many of 
whom have mobilized IR’s binary terms to recast global LGBT politics into 
contests between ‘good states’ and ‘bad states’.  And it seems to capture the 
political realities on the ground, where, for example, ‘bad states’ like Russia and 
Uganda actively work against liberal LGBT agendas, while ‘good states’ like the 
USA under Obama and the UK actively work for these agenda (Wilkinson, 2014; 
Rao, 2014).   
 
Yet there are at least three serious limitations to the international polarization 
thesis.  First, it glosses over how norms diffusion functions differently in the 
same place and time at different scales.  Second, it takes Western liberal 
formulations of LGBT norms as wholly positive benchmarks against which other 
sovereign nation-states can and should be measured.  And third, it unwittingly 
reifies international polarization in practice by authorizing some of the proposed 
mechanisms through which LGBT norms are (likely to be) indexed and diffused.   
 
In this short thought piece, I will explain these limitations in more detail by 
turning to the same core illustration Altman and Symons consider, which is ‘gay 
rights as human rights’.  I will use this discussion to think again about the 
question, ‘What is to be done?’ or, as I rephrase it, ‘Where do we go from here?’ 
 
First, the international polarization thesis glosses over how norms diffusion and 
their relationships to gay rights function differently in the same place and time at 
different scales.  Altman and Symons’ scale is generally a comparative politics 
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scale, which evaluates sovereign nation-states against one another.  At this scale, 
the idea of international polarization is easier to defend, as states taken as whole 
units do often differ from one another in how they rhetorically (if not always 
materially) support positive gay rights norms.  Yet when we investigate what 
happens within states, the picture is much more complex.  
 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton captured this complexity in a remark she made 
during the US Presidential campaign.  Speaking of the USA, Clinton said, ‘In too 
many places still, LGBT Americans are singled out for harassment and violence.  
You can get married on Saturday, post your pictures on Sunday, and get fired on 
Monday’ (Rielly, 2016). 
 
This is quite a powerful statement.  What it suggests is that – even the 
policymaker who is most credited for legitimating ‘the LGBT’ as a universally 
normal human being and for legitimating the international diffusion of the ‘gay 
rights as human rights’ norm on the back of this move (Clinton, 2011) – 
recognizes two things.  First, understandings of ‘the normal LGBT’ now sit 
alongside but do not cancel out long standing ideas about ‘the LGBT’ as perverse 
or deviant.  Second, where these understandings compete for legitimacy is not 
only among sovereign nation-states but within personal, local, national and 
regional institutions.  Underscoring the stakes of these complexities, the British 
Home Office issued a travel advisory to its LGBT citizens in the Spring of 2016, 
warning them that they may no longer be safe if they visit some US states 
because of the proliferation of homo-, bi-, and particularly trans*phobic laws in 
these states (UK Home Office, 2016).    
 
What this means is that descriptions of international politics around ‘gay rights 
as human rights’ as internationally polarized are far too simple.  What is 
required is an unpacking of the positive as well as negative ways norms around 
‘gay rights as human rights’ are diffused, while charting the complex 
interrelationships between positive and negative ‘gay rights as human rights’ 
norms.  To their credit, Altman and Symons do note some of these multi-scalar 
complexities, but not to the point that they acknowledge how these complexities 
throw their international polarization thesis into question. 
 
Second, the international polarization thesis takes the ‘gay rights as human 
rights’ norm as a fully positive idea.  This is why the international polarization 
thesis can be used to describe states as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, in relation to how well 
they adhere to this norm.  Yet as many scholars and practitioners have pointed 
out, the gay rights norm itself has some problematic elements built into it.   
 
Thinking critically about ‘gay rights as human rights’ through their intersection 
function with racism and imperialism, Jasbir Puar has written about ‘the human 
rights industrial complex’ (Puar, 2013), Rahul Rao has analyzed how ‘gay rights’ 
get taken up as ‘gay conditionality’ in public policies (Rao, 2012), and Anna 
Agathangelou has discussed how gay rights norms rely on anti-blackness 
(Agathangelou, 2013).  Anthony Langois and Cai Wilkinson offer further 
complexity to the ‘gay rights’ debate by noting how ‘gay rights’ can be coopted by 
a neo-imperialist agenda, without being essentially neo-imperialist in themselves 
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(Langlois, 2012; Wilkinson and Langlois,2014).  My own analysis of Clinton’s 
speech details the positive and/or negative ways in which Clinton proposes and 
mobilizes ‘gay rights as human rights’ for specific kinds of geopolitical, racialized, 
classed, able-bodied, gendered, and sexualized subjects that have specific – if 
contradictory – international effects (Weber, 2016a; also see Ghosh, 2016). 
 
Whether these scholars reject or refine a gay rights norm, they all explain why 
‘gay rights as human rights’ is not unambiguously positive.  For they all take 
pains to explore how toxic understandings around race, religion, class, ability, 
and gender are historically intertwined with understandings of particularly ‘the 
perverse homosexual’ and sometimes around ‘the perverse bisexual’ and/or ‘the 
perverse transsexual’.  And these scholars demonstrate how these historical 
understandings make the ‘good LGBT’ who has the right to have rights possible 
in contemporary liberal discourses on ‘gay rights as human rights’ (for 
elaborates of these points, see Weber, 2016a). 
 
In places, Altman and Symons gesture toward these kinds of concerns.  Yet their 
dominant move is to bracket these concerns and embrace a generally uncritical 
liberal understanding of rights as the basis of their comparative analysis.  This 
allows them to describe the world through their international polarization 
thesis.  This is a shame, as the careful empirical detail Altman and Symons 
provide in the book speaks to the complexities on the ground that their 
theoretical framework excludes. 
 
Finally, the international polarization thesis may unwittingly reify international 
polarization in practice, by authorizing some of the proposed mechanisms 
through which LGBT norms are (likely to be) indexed and diffused.  For example, 
the UNDP Team on Gender, Key Populations and LGBTI for HIV, Health and 
Development Group is developing an LGBTI Inclusion Index (Cortez, 2015).  This 
Index is designed to measure education, health, mechanisms for justice, and on-
the-ground policing as they pertain to LGBTI people around the world.  If we 
read this project through Clinton’s observation that ‘gay rights as human rights’ 
are unevenly embraced and enforced not only across states but within state, then 
a couple of concerns come to the fore. 
 
One such concern is that this Index may well allow Western liberal states to 
appear to be ‘sufficiently progressive’ on the things that the Index does measure 
so they do not have to do more to protect their LGBTI people on the things the 
Index does not measure (like access to jobs, housing and healthcare).  This may 
actually narrow the scope of accountability on ‘gay rights as human rights’ rather 
than broaden it.  It might prevent Western states from thinking further about 
their ‘progress’ on ‘gay rights as human rights’ and from doing more to improve 
the lives of LGBTI people on the ground.  It might also allow particularly Western 
liberal states to notice only those things they do better than other kinds of states, 
without acknowledging and fixing those problems they have in common with 
non-Western liberal states.  
 
Overall, then, the LGBTI Index might inadvertently further stigmatize states that 
are seen as insufficiently ‘progressive’ on accepting and implementing norms 
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around ‘gay rights as human rights, in ways that might fuel rather than challenge 
‘international polarization’. 
 
So, where do we go from here? 
 
I am not claiming that there is not some international polarization around ‘gay 
rights as human rights’ or that charting how international polarizations are 
constructed and mobilized are not on-going problems.  The election of Donald J. 
Trump as the 45th President of the United States of America and (at the time of 
this writing one week after Trump’s election) Trump’s friendly relationship with 
Vladimir Putin coupled with the anti-LGBT people Trump is appointing 
underscore this point (see Weber, 2016b).  But as we take seriously some 
international polarizations and their realignments, we must also bear in mind 
broader issues about and around ‘gay rights as human rights’.  By way of 
conclusion, let me mention two sets of questions we should keep in mind. 
 
First, what does the language of ‘gay rights as human rights’ actually deliver for 
LGBTI people?  How does it make their lives more and less livable?  As it is being 
translated into domestic and international policies, do these policies recognize 
and address the uneven distribution and implementation of gay rights as human 
rights not only across states but at other scales, across other issues, and in the 
complex ways rights function?  How can we make policy practitioners take 
seriously every scale that bears on the lives of LGBT people – intimate, familial, 
local, national, regional, and international?  How can we make them consider the 
range of rights that matter to LGBT people – not just marriage or military service 
but work, housing, education, healthcare and freedom of movement?  And how 
can we get them to take into account the complex ways ‘gay rights as human 
rights’ are rendered national and international in relation to gender, race, 
religion, ability, and class, for example?  And how can we make policy 
practitioners do these things in ways that acknowledge and defy the 
international polarization thesis? 
 
Second, what are the limits of human rights language itself?  Human rights 
language can be extremely valuable.  But we should also explore other 
discourses and terms of reference to secure what we understand as human 
rights for LGBTI people that can be better heard.  This is both because some 
people reject the language of universal human rights as neocolonialist or 
imperialist, while others refine the language of universal human rights to 
capture only those rights that are compatible with what some call the ‘universal 
traditional values of mankind’, a term that retains pejorative understandings of 
LGBT sexualities as sinful and criminal (Altman and Symons, 2016:111). 
 
I have no doubt I share these concerns with Altman and Symons.  I look forward 
to thinking with them about these sorts of issues, through and beyond 
frameworks of international polarization. 
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